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I.—HERBERT SPENCER: PSYCHOLOGY. 
(Continued from January No., 1877, p. 140.) 
The Principles of Psychology. By Herbert Spencer. 
2 Yols. 1876. 
After the rather remarkable attempt to show the mode of 
“ genesis ” of a simple nervous system, which was discussed 
at some length in our preceding number, Mr. Spencer begins 
the simple, though not easy task of showing the mode of “ gen¬ 
esis of compound nervous systems.” After a short reference to 
the apparent fact, that the production of pigment in the dermal 
structures of various living beings, is at least partly due to the 
action of light, Mr. Spencer proceeds to show, how the organs 
of vision are produced. He says, “ the rudimentary eye con¬ 
sists of a few pigment-grains, under the outermost dermal layer, 
and hence we may infer that rudimentary vision is constituted 
by the wave of disturbance which a sudden change in the states 
of these pigment-grains propagates through the body.” (P. 532.) 
Now, what is there to justify such an inference? 
There is absolutely no legitimate warrant for it. But this is 
only one from among hundreds of instances, in Mr. Spencer’s 
works, where important steps are taken, or positions assumed, 
apparently without a consciousness of the illegitimacy of the 
procedure. 
But to continue. “ How such pigment-grains become concen¬ 
trated in the particular place they may most advantageously 
occupy, we need not consider at length. Other things being 
equal, they will develop most where most light falls, and 
where, consequently, variations of light, caused by adjacent 
things, are strongest; and since a close cluster of pigment- 
grains, when affected, will send through the body a more effi¬ 
cient wave of disturbance, natural selection will further the con¬ 
centration—there will be a survival of individuals, in which the 
approximation is greatest, ending in the formation of an inte¬ 
grated patch. The pre-existence of a simple nervous system 
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being assumed, let us consider what will happen when incipient 
vision is added.” (P. 533). 
Will the reader kindly follow us for a moment in a scrutiny 
of this statement? 
“Incipient vision ” is assumed, as well as a" simple nervous 
system,” to which latter, visual impressions are to make their 
way, from the “ pigment-grains,” which constitute the rudi¬ 
mentary eye. Though it may be a fact that pigment-grains “will 
develop most where most light falls,” yet that the necessary 
parallel fact, that, in consequence of there being more pigment 
in the site of the rudimentary eye than elsewhere, in tne same 
proportion, more light must have fallen on that part than on 
others, is not only not established in any case, but wholly im¬ 
probable, and, indeed, incapable of proof, must be remembered. 
This latter fact, so quietly assumed, stands in a causal relation 
to the former, and hence has precedence in order of time, and 
in that of a true logical sequence. The fact which is men¬ 
tioned, depends on the fact that is assumed, and which is not 
only assumed but improbable. No one can be permitted, in 
behalf of Mr. Spencer, to evade this point, by replying that the 
accumulation of -the pigment-grains at the seat of rudi¬ 
mentary vision depends on “ other things,” as well as the stim¬ 
ulus of light, in the absence of proof that anything else was 
concerned in the matter. Such a course involves a logical sub¬ 
terfuge unworthy of the name of sound reasoning. 
But admitting these prior assumptions, what proof is there 
that when light falls upon the accumulation of pigment-grains, 
it will “send through the body” a “ wave of disturbance,” pre¬ 
sumably along the track of future visual impulses? We have 
no hesitation in declaring that there is not a single fact which 
even gives strong indirect support to this assumption. 
Finally, having got over all the difficulties in the way of the 
original acquisition of the rudimentary eye, in the manner 
shown, what evidence is there to show that “ natural selection 
will further the concentration” of granules, &c., which lead grad¬ 
ually, by a survival of the fittest, to the development of a perfect 
eye? There is none. But before passing on, we desire to offer 
a few remarks on the true office of “ natural selection.” 
The word selection always signifies a choice, between alterna¬ 
tives. It implies always two or more things, one of which, for 
exam[ile, is, for some reason, selected in preference to another. 
If we speak of a selection from among plants or animals, it is 
indisputably implied that there are tiro or more kinds, from 
which aggregate a selection is made. The ordinary plain mean¬ 
ing of the term is not impaired by reason of any peculiarity of 
the agent or means for making the selection. For example, be¬ 
cause it is called natural, it does not cease to be selection. By 
this it is meant, that those plants and animals, which are best 
fitted by their peculiarities of size, strength, endurance, &c., to 
live, under the common circumstances of their lives, will stand 
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the best chance, in the long run, to survive and propagate 
their kind, while others, less fortunate, in the particulars 
named, are placed at a disadvantage, and sooner or later perish. 
This so-called principle may enable us to explain why one 
kind has survived, while another has perished. But it seems to 
be overlooked too often by those who discuss the subject, that 
this case does not touch the vital point of inquiry. The real 
point is to explain how the same kind or class of beings came to 
be individually so different, that a selection is made possible? 
Selection did not create the differences or individual peculiari¬ 
ties, which alone render it possible. It can choose, as it were, 
between them, when they have been produced, but it would be 
absurd to declare that the differences were produced by natural, 
or any other kind of selection. Now, what is it. that produces, 
—not chooses, or even perpetuates,—the differences between 
plants or animals, differences which fender some more, others 
less, fitted to live under certain circumstances? 
Before selection can appear on the scene, all the real diffi¬ 
culties of the case have been surmounted. But how? By a 
mere assumption. For we find on every page of the writings 
of certain authors, that “ natural selection,” “ produces,” 
“creates,” “forms,” etc., for example an eye. By all means let 
the reader, however familiar he may be with such topics, pause 
and reflect, and see whether he can be satisfied that natural or 
any other kind of selection has anything whatever to do in 
producing the differences between animals, or between plants, 
after the appearance of which alone selection can come into 
play. This whole passage, concerning the mode of develop¬ 
ment of the organs of vision, is simply a tissue of ingenious 
but almost valueless assumptions. And the same judgment 
must be passed on much that is contained in the chapters on 
the genesis of “ compound ” and “ doubly-compound ” nervous 
systems. It is true that they contain many ingenious specula¬ 
tions, rather than facts, in regard to the inner development of 
the central nervous system, but they are without either prac¬ 
tical or scientific value, so far as we can see. Mr. Spencer him¬ 
self appears to be fully aware of the character of that part of 
his work under discussion. He says, “ in seeking to build up a 
general conception of the process of nervous evolution, in its 
higher stages, I have elaborated the argument quite far enough 
perhaps too far. Let me, indeed, disclaim the endeavor, which 
some may suppose I am making, to explain the process in full. 
My purpose has been rather to make the possibility of such a 
process conceivable, and I have taken specific cases and used 
concrete language, because so only could I make myself under¬ 
stood. The actual genesis has been much more involved than 
that which I have described—so involved that a true delineation, 
even if it coidd he made, would be scarcely comprehensible.” 
(P. 557). 
These latter admissions are certainly true. But if so, why 
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occupy so much space and consume so much time, in trying to 
do what cannot be done at least, in the present state ot' our 
knowledge? What we object to in general, in Mr. Spencer’s 
work, from beginning to end, is the extraordinary preponder¬ 
ance of hypothesis, or assumption over fact, and cautious rea¬ 
sonings on the same. And for ourselves, we cannot be misled 
in our endeavor to estimate the true value of such work, by any 
plea, in behalf of the place and function of speculation in the 
course of science. Its true use is a different thing from its 
habitual abuse, and when comprehensively surveyed, it must be 
alleged against the writings of Mr. Spencer, as we have said 
before, that in his use of hypothesis he habitually trespasses on 
the grounds forbidden to legitimate inference. 
The cerebellum is described in general terms, as an organ for 
“doubly-compound co-ordination ” of space-relations, and the 
cerebrum as an organ for the “ doubly compound co-ordination” 
of time-relations. 
What is the meaning of these phrases? By co-ordination is 
meant, of course, in this case, the simultaneous and equal appre¬ 
ciation of various relations, not only those which happen in the 
same place and time, but in the past, taken in connection with 
the present. One object is recognized in its space-relations, or 
event in its time-relations, as regards other positions in space, 
and other periods in time past, or even to come. 
Accordi tig to Mr. Spencer, not only is each half of the brain, 
the seat of appreciation if we may so speak, of these compound 
relations, but each half has "perfectly similar functions, and 
hence the action of the brain is not only “ compound,” but 
“ doubly-compound.” But can we by judicious analysis, sub¬ 
ordinate all the functions of the cerebellum to the category of 
“ space-relations,” and those of the cerebrum to that of time- 
relations?” For ourselves, we unhesitatingly say no. In this 
case we have conspicuously shown Mr. Spencer’s loss of balance 
as between quantitative and qualitative relations, and on the 
side of the former. It is seen everywhere in his writings. 
There is a dominating tendency in his analytic procedure to 
reduce everything to terms of matter and motion, even within 
the most interior domains of biology and psychology. Certain 
it is that the synthetical summaries of the cerebellar and cerebral 
functions, made by Mr. Spencer, Will not endure the test of 9 
even a superficial analysis, in the presence of the facts of the 
case. But we cannot in this place do more than challenge the 
adequacy of his generalizations in relation to the functions of 
the higher parts of the nervous system. 
But in chapter VI. Mr. Spencer descends in detail, to a 
description of the mental functions of the nervous system. 
To this chapter we will now direct the attention of the reader. 
Reflex action affords the starting point in the exposition. 
This is carried up from simple to complex reflexes. But as 
valuable a discovery as that of reflex action in nerve physiology 
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has been, its utility is habitually over-estimated. By its faith¬ 
ful application, very many phenomena have been and may be 
explained, that were formerly supposed to belong to a different 
category. But it should be remembered always, that reflex 
nervous actions, however complex they may be, are made up of 
an aggregation of simple reflexes, which may be brought to light 
by judicious analysis. The sphere or prerogatives of reflex 
action, are not enlarged by mere numerical, or serial complica¬ 
tions. for it does not cease by such procedures to be reflex action. 
All there is in it, is seen essentially in its simplest manifestations. 
These remarks are none the less true, when it is admitted, 
that all parts of the nervous system may be the seat of reflex 
action—the cortex cerebri, as well as the spinal cord. For it is 
one thing to admit its general prevalence throughout the 
nervous system, and it is quite another, to declare that it ex¬ 
cludes other kinds of action, in a part, which is its seat. 
These remarks are made, not so much in view of Mr. Spen¬ 
cer’s mode of treating this subject, as in view of a very general 
tendency among physiologists, in discussing the functions of 
the nervous system, to transcend the legitimate sphere of reflex 
action, in their applications of it to the same. 
But to pass on. In the endeavor to establish the true rela¬ 
tions of mental faculties and structure, in the higher parts of 
the nervous system, Mr. Spencer uses the following language: 
“Every mental faculty, rightly understood, is an internal 
plexus of nervous connexions corresponding to some plexus of 
relations among external phenomena that are habitually expe¬ 
rienced.” (P. 574.) The former is developed in any particular 
case, according to Mr. Spencer, wholly at the instance of the 
latter, except in so far as they may have been acquired by heredity. 
But if we should ask how the ancestors of any given being came 
by the nervous mechanisms they have, and inquire far enough 
back, along the line of descent, we will find that they were pro¬ 
duced wholly by the play of external stimuli upon the original 
“colloid” or protoplasm. All internal changes in structure, when 
hunted down to their ultimate causes, were produced by external 
physical agencies, and when once produced they have been 
faithfully transmitted by heredity, if encouraged by favoring 
external circumstances. But this matter of heredity, itself, is 
nothing bur. another result of the action of external physical 
agencies. Because if the peculiarity evoked in an organism, by 
a certain set of external agencies, meets with adverse external 
circumstances, then it simply is represed or perishes, to give 
way to another peculiarity to which the existing external 
influences may be more friendly. 
These may be said to be the two capital features of Mr. 
Spencer’s system of psychology, viz.: The original acquisition 
of all nervous structure, by the play of outer physical agencies, 
at first upon a structureless creature, and the subsequent per¬ 
fection of the same in the course of untold periods in time, and 
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by numberless changes in external relations, aided by the princi¬ 
ple of heredity. These two principles, which involve also, the 
law of the “ survival of the fittest,” furnish the clues to Mr. 
Spencer’s system. We shall presently examine these generaliza¬ 
tions briefly, and hence for the time dismiss them. They are 
called up at present, to enable us the more readily to compre¬ 
hend the statement, which we are now to pass under review. 
In psychology, one of the chief subjects for discussion, is that Eroeess, by means of wl.ich in its totality, we obtain our 
nowledge of what is called the “ outer world.” No subject 
within its domain has given rise to more discussion. Now what 
is perception, according to Mr. Spencer? says he: 
“Suppose such an animal as we have been consirerinp, sees approach¬ 
ing some small creature of the kind on which it preys. Then, while this 
small creature is coming nearer, but before it has readied the point at 
which its visual linage arouses the reflex action that effects its seizure, a series 
of visual images, increasing in size and definiteness, must be yielded by 
it, and it must yield an accompanying series of stimuli to the eye-muscles. 
Though the reflex action takes place only when the retinal and muscular 
impressions become combined in a certain way, yet during approach to 
the required combination, the reflex action is tending to arise, there is a 
gradually-increasing excitement of the nervo-motor apparatus, which will 
presently perform reflex action. The effect does not slop here. Through 
the established connexions there is propagated a gradually-increasfng ex¬ 
citement of the nervo-motor apparatus which catching the prey will bring 
into play—there are produced faint revivnls of the factual and gustatory 
states which capture of such prey has on past occasions yielded. Thus 
then results, what we call peception; [perception] for we have here a 
cluster of real feelings caused by the presented object, joined with a 
cluster of ideal feelings, representing certain other real feeling which the 
object has before produced, and can again produce.” ( P. 581.) Or again, 
“a perception is formed only when a cluster of real feelings excites a 
correlated cluster of ideal feelings.” (P.- 503.) 
Hpre it will be noted by the reader, that the same remarkable 
fondness for assumptions is displayed that we have discussed at 
length, elsewhere. We do not forget that Mr. Spencer is intro¬ 
ducing examples such as we have quoted, largely for purposes of 
illustration, nor that in this volume, he is dealing professedly 
with “ objective psychology.” But can it be shown, has it ever 
been shown, that the catching of a mouse, say by a cat, is sim¬ 
ply a ref ex action, only this and nothing more, as Mr. Spencer 
more than implies in the passage quoted? Does perception, im¬ 
ply anything beyond reflex action ? 
On all hands, it is admitted to imply feeling, which, in its 
ordinary sense, at least, is not involved in simple reflex action, 
though it may be, as it is in that class of reflexes, known to 
some as “ sensori-motor.” But does not perception imply more 
than mere feeling, or simple apprehension of some particular 
condition of the sensory nervous apparatus? According to Mr. 
Spencer’s account, a perception is composed as follows: “We 
have,” says he, speaking of perception, “a cluster of real feelings, 
caused by the presented object, joined with a cluster of ideal 
feelings, representing certain other real feelings, which the ob¬ 
ject has before produced, and can produce again.” 
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Nothing but “ feelings,” are found in this catalogue of the 
component elements of perception. 
To group feelings into clusters, does not make of them any¬ 
thing but feelings. It is hardly possible under the circum¬ 
stances, to suppose a sort of chemical combination among them 
so as to obtain by their combination a compound, as we may in 
chemistry, having qualities or properties different from what the 
were corn- 
each sepa¬ 
rate feeling retains its characteristics, much the same as if it 
existed alone, though there are some apparent, rather than real, 
exceptions to this statement. But by what means are these “clus¬ 
ters of feelings” formed? By “co-ordinating plexuses,” accord¬ 
ing to Mr. Spencer. We will shortly consider the idea of “ co¬ 
ordinating plexuses,” which, we believe, on anatomical and 
physiological grounds to be well founded, but to be, to some 
extent, illegitimately used by our author. 
We know, perhaps, quite as well as we need to know, of the 
great difficulty, not to say, impossibility, which lies in the way 
of drawing a satisfactory distinction between feeling and know¬ 
ing, or knowledge. It may, perhaps, be truly said that it is not 
possible to know without feeling, though we should greatly hes¬ 
itate to declare that it is impossible to feel without knowing. 
But it would hardly seem to be a question with Mr. Spencer. 
It is feeling from first to last, the differences being those of 
number and complexity of grouping. Knowing is simply a 
more refined and complex form of feeling. Thqre is no real dis¬ 
tinction, except for figurative purposes, between feeling and 
thought. At any rate, this is the impression very naturally 
gathered by a perusal of his writings. 
For our own part, we maintain a distinction is to be made, 
as between thought and feeling, closely as they are related in 
experience, and that both these elements enter into perception, 
and hence that it is inadequately treated, and that the process is 
not faithfully delineated by Mr. Spencer, in any part of his writ¬ 
ing. But we are not able to treat this subject in the present 
notice as it deserves to be, but hope to do so, in the near future, 
in a work on the “Philosophy of Perception.” 
But, says Mr. Spencer, “ we may now pass from perceptions to 
ideas properly so called. Though every true perception, along 
with the presentative feelings, necessarily contains certain repre¬ 
sentative feelings, these do not, at first, become what are usu¬ 
ally understood by ideas. They have not the detachableness 
which distinguishes ideas that are fully developed. * * * * 
When do ideas, rightly so-called, arise? They arise when com¬ 
pound co-ordination, passes into doubly compound co-ordination, 
* * * * They are the necessary concomitants of that pro¬ 
cess by which thorough intercalated psychical states, there is 
established a Aediate relation between psychical states that can 
not be brought into immediate relation. And they have for 
elements entering into it seemed to have before they 
bined. Though a member of an assumed “cluster,” 
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their seat those intercalated plexuses, which co-ordinate the co¬ 
ordinating plexuses previously existing.” (P. 565.) We begin 
with simple sense impressions, and simple reflex action. Then 
we advance a step higher, to another class of centres, or “ plex¬ 
uses,” which are capable of taking up into themselves the pri¬ 
mary impressions made on the lowest class of plexuses. This 
second class of “ plexuses” co-ordinate and combine simple 
sense impressions. The impressions made on this second order 
of plexuses is transmitted to a higher set of plexuses, where they, 
too, are co-ordinated. This is “compound co-ordination,” as the 
former was “simple.” This “compound co-ordination” it is, 
which yields “ perception.” Next in order, if not finally, we 
have a still higher class of “ co-ordinating plexuses,” which work 
up the result arrived at in “ compound co-ordination,” and this 
is “ doubly-compound co-ordination,” and the result is ideas. 
But what is an emotion? “The plexuses which co-ordinate 
the visual impressions yielded by an apple on the table, with the 
motor act, required to grasp it, and with the ideas of tactual 
and gustatory sensations it will yield, are nearly the same as 
certain plexuses that have before worked together. * * * * 
Each plexus has been inherited in the form of a well-organized 
set of connexions, obscured by multitudinous feeble connexions, 
and the inherited central connexions of the plexus first excited, 
are definitely connected with the inherited central connexions 
of the similarly constructed plexus that is habitually excited 
after it. The accompanying subjective results are these: The 
consciousness of* an approaching body, making sounds and mo¬ 
tions of a certain kind, is followed by a consciousness of painful 
states, sensory and motor, having no definite localizations, The 
immediate perception, with the crowd of ideas, resulting from 
preceding similar perceptions, arouses not only ideas of particu¬ 
lar pains that have followed such perceptions in the life of the 
individual, but through the inherited organization it arouses an 
indefinite sense of ill—a cloud of dim feelings of suffering that 
cannot be reduced to form, because they have not been experi¬ 
enced—the emotion of fear. And with the primitive form of 
fear, thus physically organized and psychically constituted, there 
are afterwards integrated the higher and more involved forms of 
fear; all of which have for their central element, ideal feelings 
of pain or discomfort that are unlocalizable, and therefore vague. 
Respecting emotious, it has only to be added that they, like 
ideas, result from the co-ordinating actions of the cerebrum and 
cerebellum upon the medulla oblongata and the structures it pre¬ 
sides over. * * * * The medulla being the seat of all feel¬ 
ings, whether aroused from within or without, etc." (P. 571-2.) 
From the foregoing extracts and considerations, the reader 
may see what are Mr. Spencer’s views as to the real nature of 
such mental states and products, as perceptions, ijjeas, emotions, 
etc.,—from a physiological standpoint. 
But we will postpone remarks on the adequacy of Mr. Spen- 
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cer’s interpretation of psychological phenomena from the phys¬ 
iological point of view, until we have what are his interpreta¬ 
tions of the same phenomena from psychological points of view, 
to which we are soon to pass briefly, 
Before leaving the physiological side of our subject, we desire 
to offer a few remarks, on the notion that the medulla is the com¬ 
mon seat of feeling and emotion. A few eminent physiologists 
have held to this view, and as we have seen, it is adopted by Mr. 
Spencer. It is supported by the high authority of M. Vulpian. 
This opinion was discussed, to some extent, in our last number, 
in a review of Professor Perrier’s book, the “ Functions of the 
Brain.” We cannot do more at present, than to express a cer¬ 
tain degree of surprise, that it should be seriously maintained, in 
the present state of our knowledge, that the medulla oblongata 
is the seat of the emotions, or the highest forms of feeling. The 
cerebral cortex, it seems to us, all the real evidence points to as 
their seat. We predict that the time is not far distant when but 
few, if any, will venture to maintain any other view. But we 
cannot, in this place, enter into an adequate discussion of this 
subject. 
We desire, also, to call attention to a passage in regard to the 
localization of function in the brain, which will serve to show, 
as well as any other, the suggestiveness of many parts of Mr. 
Spencer’s writings. It is as follows: 
“ Whoever,” says he, “ calmly considers the question, cannot long re¬ 
sist the conviction that different parts of the cerebrum must, in some my 
or other, subserve different laws of mental action. Localization of func¬ 
tion is the law of all organization whatever, and it would be mnrvellous, 
were there here an exception. If it be admitted that the cerebral hemis¬ 
pheres are the seats of the higher psychical activities, if it be admitted 
that among these higher psychical activities there are distinctions of kind, 
which, though not definite, are yet practically recognizable, it cannot be 
denied, without going in direct opposition to established physiological 
principles, that these more or less distinct kinds of psychical activity 
must be carried on in more or less distinct parts of the cerebral hemis¬ 
pheres. To question this is to ignore the truths of neuro-physiology, as 
well as those of physiology in general. It is proved experimentally, that 
every bundle of nerve-fibres and every ganglion has a special duty, and 
that each part of every such bundle, ana every such ganglion has a duty 
still more special. Can it be, then, that in the great hemispherical gan- 
lia alone, this specialization of duty does not hold? That there are no 
conspicuous divisions here is true, but it is also true in other cases, where 
there are undeniable differences of function—instance the spinal cord, or 
one of the great nerve-bundles. 
Just as there are aggregated together in a sciatic nerve, an immense 
number of fibres, each of which has a particular office, referring to some 
one part of the leg, but all of which have for their joint duty, the manage¬ 
ment of the leg as a whole; so, in any one region of the cerebrum, each 
fibre may be concluded to have some particular office, which, in common 
with the particular offices of many neighboring fibres, is merged in some 
general office fulfilled that region of the cerebrum. 
Any other hypothesis seems to me, on the face of it, untenable. Either 
there is some arrangement, some organization, in the cerebrum, or there 
is none. If there is no organization, the cerebrum is a chaotic mass of 
fibres, incapable of performing any orderly action. If there is some 
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organization, it must consist in that same “physiological division on 
labor,” in which all organization consists; and there is no division of 
labor, physiological or other, but what involves the concentration of 
special kinds of activity in special places. (P. 573-4.) 
These statements we believe to be strictly true, and to have an¬ 
ticipated in a remarkable manner the best results of subsequent 
research into the anatomy and physiology of the brain. It is in 
striking contrast with the singular and seemingly chaotic doct¬ 
rines in respect to the same subject, enunciated during the past 
few years by Dr. Brown-Sequard. But the subject of localization 
of function in the brain will receive rather extended notice in our 
next number in the concluding portion of our review of the work 
of Dr. Ferrier. To what is there to be said, we would invite the 
attention of the reader. 
It will be hardly possible for us in our brief notice, to 
enter at greater length into Mr. Spencer's mode of treating 
psychological themes from a physiological point of view. 
Before we close we shall recur once again to this subject. 
What are Mr. Spencer’s doctrines in regard to the nature 
of mind? Does it have, substantially, a separate existence from 
the nervous organization, with which, if it is a separate entity, 
it is intimately associated during the continuance of corporeal 
life, or is it simply a name for the aggregate of the higher func¬ 
tions of the nervous system, as contraction is the name for the 
function of muscle? In speaking of the ‘•composition of mind,” 
it is said “the proximate components of mind are of two broadly- 
contrasted kinds—Feelings, and the Relations between feelings.” 
But what is a feeling? It “is any portion of consciousness 
which occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable in¬ 
dividuality; which has its individuality marked off from adjacent 
portions of consciousness, by qualitative contrasts, and which, 
when introspectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous. 
These are the essentials.” (P. 164, vol. I.) The “relations” 
spoken of as the other class of ultimate components of mind, 
are but a sort of feeling, for it is said that “it is true that, under 
an ultimate analysis, what we call a relation proves to be itself 
a kind of feeling." In the final analysis, therefore, it appears 
that mind is “composed” solely offeelings. This is essentially 
the position of Hume, not to mention that of other members 
of the Lockean School. 
One thing is quite noticeable in these and many similar state¬ 
ments,—the carrying of chemical and spatial conceptions into 
discussions of consciousness. 
But to pass on from questions as to the “composition” of 
mind, what shall be said as to its “substance,” its substantial in¬ 
dependence of the nervous organism, which some regard as its 
instrument, during the corporeal life of the individual? Mr. 
Spencer devotes to this subject a rather remarkable chapter, 
and to some of the statements contained in it we invite the 
attention of the reader. 
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Mr. Spencer is a phenomenalist, apparently, of a rather pro¬ 
nounced type. In certain parts of the chapter on the “substance 
of mind,” it is distinctly asserted that we know nothing of mind, 
and can know nothing of it. He says: “To write a chapter 
for the purpose of showing that nothing is known or can be 
known of the subject which the title of the chapter indicates, 
will be thought strange. It is, however, in this case needful,” 
etc. (P. 145). It is the old story of the phenomenalists,—all 
we know is the phenomenon,—that which causes it, or gives it 
birth, we cannot know. Phenomena appear in the physical 
world, and they are referred to what we call matter, or within 
consciousness, and are referred to what we call mind, but it is 
the high office of certain forms of philosophy, overlooking the 
bases, and discrediting the value, of inference, to insist we do 
not, and can not know anything of either. They are radically 
inaccessible to our faculties. AH we know, or can know, as 
Berkley declared in respect to matter, and Hume, for mind as 
well as matter, is our impressions and ideas,—only these and 
nothing more. And among the followers of Berkley and Hume, 
we may unhesitatingly range Mr. Spencer. 
But here arises one of the many difficulties which stand in 
the way of a critical estimate of the value and tendencies of Mr. 
Spencer's labors. 
It so often happens that what is said at one time is apparently 
conceded, or even contradicted, at another. In the chapter now 
under consideration—“The Substance of Mind”—he says: 
“Mind is, certainly in some cases, probably in all, resolvable into 
nervous shocks, and these nervous shocks answer to the waves 
of molecular motion that traverse nerves and nerve centres. 
Thus, not only is the substance of mind supposed to be know- 
able as having this universal character, but it is closely assim¬ 
ilated to, if not identified with nervous shocks." But after these 
and many other like declarations, Mr. Spencer writes in the 
same chapter as follows: “The foregoing reasoning brings us 
no nearer to a final solution of the question. Even could we 
succeed in proving that mind consists of homogenous units of 
feeling, of the nature specified, we should be unable to say what 
mind is. * * * * The reduction of all the more 
complex forms to the simplest form, leaves us with nothing but 
this simplest form, out of which to form thought; and thought 
cannot be framed out of one term only. Representation and 
re-representation of this ultimate unit of consciousness, in terms 
of itself ’, leaves us at last just where we were at first. * * 
* * When the two modes of being which we dis¬ 
tinguish as Subject and Object, have been severally reduced to 
their lowest terms, any further comprehension must be an as¬ 
similation of these lowest terms to one another; and, as we have 
already seen, this is negatived by the very distinction of subject 
and object, which is itself the consciousness of a difference 
transcending all oher differences. * * * * Can 
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we think of the subjective and objective activities as the same? 
Can the oscillation of a molecule be represented in conscious¬ 
ness side by side with a nervous shock,and the two be recognized 
as one? No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of 
feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes 
more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposi¬ 
tion. And the immediate verdict of consciousness thus given, 
might be analytically justified were this a fit place for the need¬ 
ful analysis. * * * * Here, indeed, we arrive at 
the barrier which needs to be perpetually pointed out, alike to 
those who seek materialistic explanations of mental phenomena, 
and to those who are alarmed lest such explanations may be 
found. The last class prove by their fear, almost as much as 
the first prove by their hope, that they believe mind may be 
possibly interpreted in terms of matter, whereas many whom 
they vituperate as materialists, are profoundly convinced that 
there is not the remotest possibility of so interpreting them. 
* * * * It may be as well to say here, once 
for all, that were we compelled to choose between the alterna¬ 
tives of translating mental phenomena into physical phenomena, 
or of translating physical phenomena into mental phenomena, 
the latter alternative would seem the more acceptable of the two. 
Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggre¬ 
gate of activities, and the cohesion of these activities, one with 
another, throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a 
something of winch they are the activities." (P. 158-9, vol. I.) 
These admissions are certainly remarkable when taken in 
connection with other deliberate statements of Mr. Spencer. 
For our own part, we fully agree with them. If we had to 
choose either of the alternatives mentioned to the exclusion of 
the other, we would certainly choose with Mr. Spencer. But 
we have never felt ourselves to be in the position which such a 
choice would imply. 
We hold mental and physical phenomena to be at bottom of 
entirely different orders. They cannot by any legitimate, and 
hence rational procedure, be analyzed the one into the other, or 
both into some tertium quid, in which they may coalesce in 
substantial unity. It has never been done, and so far as wecan 
see it never can be. 
As to the proof of the existence of what has been called Mind, 
there is no direct evidence outside of the phenomena of con¬ 
sciousness if there is there. But when we consider in their 
completeness mental phenomena, we are compelled, as Mr. 
Spencer says, to the “postulation of a something of which they 
ore the activities," at the point of a cogent inference, or series of 
inferences. The phenomena imperatively require some such 
agent or cause, as mind is said to be. And the kind of evidence 
which leads to this conclusion is just as valid, or may be, as is 
the so-called direct evidence. There is much to be learned yet, 
as to the real function and value of Inference, in the domain of 
the natural and physical sciences. 
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But though we know two groups of phenomena, “physical ” 
and “ mental,” acknowledged to be radically distinct from each 
other, and though we seem to be compelled to postulate a pair 
of substantial entities, to which they respectively belong, yet it 
is held by Mr. Spencer in strict conformity to the dictates of 
phenomenalism, that we neither do nor can know anything of 
either. They are relegated to the “ unknowable.” This is ex¬ 
actly the position of Hume. Mr. Spencer not only feels “com¬ 
pelled ” to admit an unknowable, substantial basis on the one 
hand for physical, and on the other for mental phenomena, but 
beyond these, a single form of “ Unconditioned Being common 
to the two.” 
He says, “though of the two it seems easier to translate so-called 
matter into spirit, that to translate so-called spirit into matter, 
{which latter is indeed wholly impossible,) yet no translation 
can carry us beyond our symbols. Such vague conceptions as 
loom up before us are illusions conjured up by the wrong conno¬ 
tations of our words. The expression “ substance of mind,” if 
we use it in any other way than as the x of our equation, inevit¬ 
ably betrays us into errors, for we cannot think of substance 
save in terms that imply material properties. Our only course 
is to recognize our symbols as symbols only; and to rest content 
with that duality of them which our constitution necessitates. 
The unknowable, as manifested to us within the limits of 
consciousness in the shape of feeling, being no less inscrutable 
than the unknowable as manifested beyond the limits of con¬ 
sciousness in other shapes, we approach no nearer to understand¬ 
ing the last by rendering it into the first. The conditioned 
form under which being is presented in the subject, cannot, any 
more than the conditioned form under which being is presented 
in the object, be the unconditioned being common to the two." 
<P. 161-2, Vol. I.) 
This not only puts the “ substance of mind,” and the “ sub¬ 
stance of matter,” beyond the actual, or even the possible 
sphere, of human knowledge, but merges them into an uncon¬ 
ditioned, and unknowable something that lies beyond, in the 
bottomless abyss of our absolute and everlasting ignorance. 
This is a stretch of philosophical humility, not to say candor, to 
which we have never yet been led, and we devoutly hope we 
may never be. Either there is some peculiar meaning given to 
the word “ knowledge,” which we do not fully comprehend, or we 
must, and we do contend, that we know something of matter, and 
something of mind. And we make this declaration in tolerably 
full view of the course and results of speculation concerning 
these subjects in the past. But we cannot, in this already long 
notice, do justice to such topics. But we expect to discuss them 
at length in a work which has occupied no small portion of our 
time andfthought for many years past. 
We have no time or space in this present notice, in which to 
•examine in detail the remaining contents of these two goodly 
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volumes, and in which we have the nature and modes of action 
of the various mental faculties considered, often with wearisome 
minuteness of speculative detail, and in which the modes of ac¬ 
quiring our various forms of knowledge are exposed at length, 
in attempted conformity to the law of evolution, and by the aid 
of a highly refined and problematical physics of the nervous 
system, which latter point, however, we have considered at 
some length in the earlier part of this notice. 
There are two capital features, amongst a few others, in Mr. 
Spencer’s psychological system. They are,—first, that not only 
all changes toward complexity or perfection, but the original 
genesis of a nervous system, is dependent on. external physical 
agencies, and their varying modes of action. The inner mec¬ 
hanism, and its action, are alike incidental to the action of such 
agents. The impulse to organization is originally from without. 
The forces set in play are from without. The “tendency to 
vary” is from without, since it depends in a final analysis of its 
conditions, on variations in external causes, as do the specific 
variations in structure and action of the nervous mechanism. 
Except in a secondary sense, nothing is from within. The inter¬ 
nal structure is but an organized history of the action in space 
and time, of matters external and related to the animal organism. 
The second feature to which we have alluded, is that of 
heredity. To this so-called principle is committed every change, 
actual or hypothetical, which rises into view in the course of a 
progressive evolution. And this in the face of the teachings of 
experience, that very many acquired peculiarities of structure, 
and hence of action, are not perceptibly transmissible. But 
neither of these features were originated by Mr. Spencer. They 
have been long familiar to those who have given themselves to 
the study of the phenomena of living beings. 
Mr. Spencer has not established any important facts or laws 
in the province of nerve-physiology or psychology proper. But 
he has carried physical conceptions and quantitative relations, 
almost throughout the domain of both these sciences, as we 
must persist in calling them, and with results, which, in our 
judgment, are almost valueless, when compared with the labor 
expended in procuring them. Mr. Spencers work, in this latter 
phase, differs from all its predecessors, in the thoroughness and 
minuteness of its elaboration. In his application of physical 
conceptions and a physical nomenclature to vital and mental 
processes, he does not content himself with generalities, but 
enters with pemarkable particularity into his work. But after 
all, we are unable to point out to our readers any substantial 
results, of practical value, arising of Mr. Spencer’s labors in the 
psychological field, except in the way of their suggestiveness. 
In this latter respect they are worthy of high praise. 
